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Abstract This study investigates the prevalence and extent of altruism by ex-
amining the relationship between parents’ and their adult children’s subjective
well-being in a data set extracted from the German Socio-Economic Panel. To
segregate the share of parents with altruistic preferences from those who are
selfish, we estimate a finite mixture regression model. We control for various
sources of potential bias by taking advantage of the data’s panel structure. To
validate our modeling approach, we show that predicted altruists indeed make
higher average transfer payments.
Keywords Altruism · Subjective well-being ·
Finite mixture regression models
JEL Classification C23 · D64
1 Introduction
Happiness data are increasingly used to tackle important problems in eco-
nomics, as reviewed by Frey and Stutzer (2002), Layard (2005), and Di
Tella and MacCulloch (2006). Indeed, the recent surge in interest is quite
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dramatic, as pointed out by Clark et al. (2006), who counted 417 happiness-
related articles in Econlit between 1960 and 2005, 76% of which had been
published since 1995 and 30% since 2003. Most of these papers use, in one
way or another, responses to current happiness or life satisfaction questions in
cross-section and panel survey data to study the factors motivating individual
behavior, as well as the effects of behavior, policies, and institutions, on well-
being. With the odd exception, much of the previous literature takes a purely
individualistic approach to happiness.
The aim of this study is to broaden the existing literature by focusing on
positive preference interdependence as in Becker (1981), which may result in
altruistic behavior. The question of how widely and to what extent altruistic
preferences are present in the population is important in various fields of
economics. In public economics, the presence of altruism in a substantial frac-
tion of the population may, by adjusting charitable giving and other voluntary
transfers, neutralize governmental attempts at redistributing income between
generations (Laferrere and Wolff 2006). In macroeconomic growth modeling,
it is crucial to distinguish between two different motivations for intergenera-
tional transfer payments, altruism or joy of giving (Barro 1974; Bertola et al.
2006). With altruism, individuals’ preferences exhibit positive interdependence
so that their current utility levels correspond to the discounted utility flows of
all future generations, which results in an infinite planning horizon. Individuals
motivated solely by joy of giving, however, do not care about the utility of their
offspring and, consequently, their bequests will be driven solely by the utility
obtained from donating per se. This supports an overlapping generation’s
point of view instead of an infinite planning horizon. Moreover, as Fehr and
Fischbacher (2002) point out, when markets are imperfect, even a minority of
people exhibiting some sort of social preferences, such as altruism, can have a
major impact on the equilibrium.
In contrast to other studies on altruism, which rely on the analysis of
consumption levels and transfers, we focus on subjective well-being as an
immediate indicator of utility. Besides being straightforward, this approach
allows us to identify altruistic preferences even in a case where the income
gap between parents and their children is not wide enough to trigger transfer
payments. Imagine a situation where the parents’ and their children’s marginal
utilities of income are almost the same. In such a case, the parents’ marginal
disutility of reduced consumption associated with a transfer payment is likely
to exceed the marginal utility gained from a transfer-induced increase in the
children’s happiness. So, even if these parents have altruistic preferences in the
sense that they care for their children’s happiness, this is not revealed in trans-
fer or consumption patterns. However, by directly analyzing the dependence
of the parents’ utility on their children’s subjective well-being, our approach
allows us to still detect altruistic preferences even in the absence of any transfer
payments.
Our analysis is based on data from the German Socio-Economic Panel
(GSOEP), a representative annual panel survey initiated in 1984. As the panel
population ages, children become adults, move out of their parental homes,
Happiness functions with preference interdependence... 1065
and set up their own households. The GSOEP has the nice feature that it
surveys these descendants’ households as well, and thus allows us to generate
linked parent–child observations. Between 2000 and 2004, we observe a total of
2,577 interviewed parents with at least one child living in a spin-off household.
As these parents are observed in several waves of the panel, and some of
them have more than just one adult child who has left home, the number of
linkable parent–child pairs amounts to 11,330. Each of these pairs is observed
on average for slightly more than 3 years.
Winkelmann (2005), using GSOEP data as well but a different sample
including children still at home, reports a long-run correlation of 0.4 to 0.5 in
subjective well-being between parents and children. In principle, there are at
least three different explanations for this finding: First, attitudes towards well-
being may be genetically transmitted. Second, parents and children may share,
to some extent, the same environmental and socioeconomic attributes. Third,
the correlation may be due to a direct, positive, and causal dependence of the
parents’ utility functions on the utility of their adult children, i.e., altruism. To
isolate the latter effect, we suggest an estimation strategy based on panel data.
We know from experimental economic research that there exist several
distinct social preference types, and at least a minority of people seem to ex-
hibit altruistic preferences (see, for example, Fehr and Schmidt 2002). Besides
reporting vast heterogeneity, Andreoni and Miller (2002), for example, find
evidence based on a series of dictator games that about 23% of their partici-
pants treat their own and the other’s payoffs as perfect substitutes, a behavior
compatible with altruism. Phelps (2001) conducts thematic apperception tests,
a battery of psychological tests aimed at identifying altruistic motivation, and
finds that around 20% of the participants responded in an altruistic manner.
We will compare our estimates of the prevalence of altruistic preferences,
based on survey data, with these findings, gained by applying completely dif-
ferent methodologies in other fields of economic and psychological research.
By estimating a finite mixture regression model, we account for unobserved
heterogeneity, i.e., the existence of different social preference types, and iso-
late the share of altruists in a representative household sample. Distinguishing
between two preference types allows us to separate the fraction of altruistic
parents from the remainder of the sample, which is assumed to behave self-
ishly.1 As the finite mixture model endogenously assigns a group membership
(altruistic/selfish) probability to each parent, we can test on an individual level
how altruism corresponds to transfer payments. This allows us to check the
plausibility of the endogenous group assignment, as we expect parents with
altruistic preferences to pay – at least on average – higher transfers towards
their children.
In Section 2, the structure of the data set is discussed in greater detail,
and descriptive statistics are provided. Section 3 covers the basic econometric
1A related approach has been previously applied by Clark et al. (2005) in the context of estimating
the responses of well-being to income changes.
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model, an extension to account for household-specific effects, and estimation.
Section 4 presents and interprets the results, while Section 5 concludes.
2 Data structure and descriptive statistics
The analysis is based on the GSOEP, an annual survey of households, which
was started in 1984 in West Germany and extended to East Germany in 1990
(Wagner et al. 1993). As mentioned above, it is an important feature of the
GSOEP that it follows up on adult children who moved out of their parental
homes and may now live in their own families. In more recent waves of the
GSOEP, the number of such children living in spin-off households has become
large enough to permit empirical studies of parent–child pairs.
We analyze data for the years 2000–2004.2 In a first step, we extract 2,577
distinct parents with at least one traced child living in a spin-off household.
Note that, because for any given parent the number of these children varies
between one and five, the number of observed parent–child pairs is higher
than the actual number of parents in the data set. Table 1 summarizes the data
structure for each wave of the panel. For example, among the 1,616 parents
observed in the year 2000 wave, 1,205 parents have only one child living outside
the parental household. The remaining 411 parents have several children, so
that the total number of observed parent–child pairs adds up to 2,108. The
panel is not balanced, as the number of both parents and parent–child pairs
varies over time. In total, the data set contains 8,775 parent observations and
11,330 parent–child pair observations.
Besides a broad range of socioeconomic variables, the GSOEP provides
information on subjective well-being, which can be interpreted as a direct
measure of individual utility and, thus, is of central interest to this paper.
All respondents are asked directly about their general life satisfaction by the
following question: “How satisfied are you with your life, all things considered?
Please answer according to the following scale: 0 means completely dissatisfied,
10 means completely satisfied.” Because general life satisfaction is measured
on an ordinal scale, it needs special consideration in regression models, with
parent’s well-being as dependent variable and children’s well-being as explana-
tory variable. Section 3 discusses these issues in greater detail.
For both parents and children, we extract the following characteristics from
the data set, which are generally thought of as being important determinants
of subjective well-being (see, for example, Frey and Stutzer 2001): health, age,
employment status, monthly disposable income, household size, marital status,
and mean geographical distance between the parental household and the spin-
off households. Health is measured on a self-reported, five-point scale that
is, for simplicity, converted into an indicator variable of good health status
for the highest two values. In contrast to other studies, such as Clark and
2The 2004 wave was the latest release when this research was started. Before 2000, the number of
child spin-offs was relatively small, and we therefore took 2000 as our initial year.
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Table 1 Data structure
Number of children living outside Number of parent observations
the parental household 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2000–2004
One 1,205 1,279 1,313 1,377 1,458 6,632
Two 341 334 363 373 370 1,781
Three 63 51 61 77 74 326
Four 3 3 7 5 4 22
Five 4 4 2 2 2 14
Total 1,616 1,671 1,746 1,834 1,908 8,775
Total number of parent–child 2,108 2,132 2,260 2,384 2,446 11,330
pair observations
Source: GSOEP 2000–2004
Oswald (1994), who find evidence for a U-shaped effect of ageing on reported
subjective well-being with a minimum around 35 years, age is included among
the other regressors only in linear form. Because all the parents in the sample
are at least 32 years of age, the effect of ageing is expected to be nearly
monotonically and positively associated with general life satisfaction. We
measure the mean distance in kilometers between the parents’ households
and their spin-off households based on the geographical coordinate of the
country’s midpoint, as discussed by Schwarze and Winkelmann (2005). As it
is plausible that parents know less about their children the farther away they
live, this provides a proxy measure for the parent’s general knowledge about
their children’s living conditions.
Parents may exhibit paternalistic preferences, that is to say, they do not
only care about their children’s well-being but they may derive direct utility
from other attributes of their children, such as education, marital status, and
income, regardless of the effect of these attributes on their children’s well-
being, i.e., for a given level of well-being. If this is the case, adding the
children’s socioeconomic characteristics as controls is crucial for obtaining an
unbiased estimator of the prevalence and extent of altruistic preferences.
Additionally, the data set contains information on the annual amount of
monetary transfers paid to the children by their parents. This variable is
interesting for two reasons: First, if the parents’ motivation for paying transfers
is joy of giving or reciprocity instead of altruism, we expect parents’ well-being
to be positively associated with these transfers ceteris paribus, i.e., for a given
level of the child’s well-being. Thus, we should include it among the other
control variables. Second, after assigning each parent to one of the two groups,
it allows us to compare the average transfer payments of the altruistic parents
with the selfish ones.
Table 2 reveals that children report, on average, a much better health
status than their parents, and the mean difference in age between parents
and children is about 27 years. Due to their lower age, but possibly also
because of secular trends in cohabitation, fewer children than parents are
married. Standard errors are reported in parentheses, and we see that the mean
differences are statistically significant.
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Table 2 Descriptive statistics
Means (std. err. in parentheses) Parents Children
Subjective well-beinga 6.573 (0.019) 7.055 (0.020)
Good health (yes=1/no=0) 0.311 (0.005) 0.697 (0.006)
Age 57.4 (0.093) 30.7 (0.075)
Unemployed (yes=1/no=0) 0.085 (0.003) 0.070 (0.003)
Monthly income (in EUR) 4,567 (32.78) 4,030 (25.97)
Female (yes=1/no=0) 0.542 (0.005) 0.513 (0.006)
Years of schooling 11.2 (0.026) 12.3 (0.031)
Household size 2.409 (0.011) 2.470 (0.015)
Married (yes=1/no=0) 0.822 (0.004) 0.460 (0.005)
Transfers paid per year (in EUR) 1,315 (60.14)
Distance between households (in kilometers) 48.2 (1.137)
Person-year observations 8,775b 6,606c
Source: GSOEP 2000–2004
aMeasured on a 0, 1, . . . , 10 scale
bExcludes multiple person-year observations for parents with several children
cExcludes multiple person-year observations for children with two parents
3 Model
3.1 Basic model
Our basic modeling framework is an extension of the standard ordered probit
model, which allows us to endogenously separate altruistic parents from those
who are assumed to be selfish. Let hit = j, j = 0, 1, . . . , 10, denote the ordered
response of parent i at time t on the 11-point happiness scale. Similarly, vit is
the ordered response of parent i’s child at time t. If there is more than one
child, vit is taken to be the response of parent i’s child at time t.
The main object of interest is P(hit = j|xit), the conditional probabil-
ity model for the ordered response of the parents’ happiness, where xit =
(xit1, . . . , xitk)′ is a (k × 1) vector of determinants of subjective well-being, dis-
cussed in the previous section, excluding a constant. If we assume an ordered
probit formulation with a linear index function x′itβ = xit1β1 + . . . + xitkβk, as
in McKelvey and Zavoina (1975), we obtain
P
(
hit = j|xit
) = (κj − x′itβ
) − (κj−1 − x′itβ
)
, (1)
where κ j > κ j−1 are threshold values, and  denotes the cumulative density
function of the standard normal distribution.
To account for heterogeneity in the parents’ preference types, we introduce
an indicator variable, ai, such that ai = 0 if parent i is selfish and does not care
for the well-being of her adult child, and ai = 1 if she is altruistic. For altruistic
parents, their children’s well-being, vit, becomes one of the determinants of
their own utility, and we therefore expect its coefficient, η, to be positive.
However, for selfish parents, the children’s well-being has no effect on their
Happiness functions with preference interdependence... 1069
own general life satisfaction. This yields the conditional probability model’s
basic form
P
(
hit = j|xit, vit, ai
) = (κ j − x′itβ − aiηvit
) − (κ j−1 − x′itβ − aiηvit
)
. (2)
In this formulation, the child’s well-being, vit, enters as an explanatory
variable. Because we treat the parents’ happiness hit as an ordinal variable, we
should, by symmetry, make the same assumption on the child’s well-being. It is
not immediately obvious how this can be done in a regression context. Rather
than including indicator variables for each possible response value (in which
case we lose the ordering information), we follow Terza (1987) and replace
vit by a cardinalization that is compatible with the ordered probit assumption,
i.e., an underlying normally distributed latent linear index v∗it. The children’s
subjective well-being responses are replaced by their conditional expectations
v˜it = E
(
v∗it|vit = j
) = E(v∗it|μ( j−1) ≤ v∗it < μ( j)
) = φ(μ( j−1)) − φ(μ( j))
(μ(l)) − (μ( j−1)) , (3)
where μ( j)s denote the quantiles of the standard normal distribution for
the sample cumulative relative frequencies of the 11 response categories
j = 0, 1, . . . , 10, and φ stands for the standard normal density. To test the
robustness of our results, we modeled children’s well-being as an indicator,
which takes on the value 1 if vit > 4 and zero otherwise, instead of applying
Terza’s cardinalization. Besides the obvious loss in efficiency, our estimates
remained largely unaffected.
We include the well-being index of the representative (=average) child for
parents with several children in the above expression. Therefore, we implicitly
assume that parents weigh their children’s well-being equally.3 To simplify the
interpretation of the model, v˜it is centered around zero, which ensures that its
effect on the parents’ happiness is captured solely by η and does not have any
influence on the vector of threshold parameters κ j.
3.2 Extensions
So far, the model assumes a pooled data structure and does not take advantage
of the fact that the panel data set contains up to five observations on each
parent over time. The data’s panel structure, however, may help to resolve
some of the potential endogeneity problems.
First, if there is unobserved variation in the parents’ permanent con-
sumption levels, which is correlated with the children’s consumption due to
some unobserved time-unvarying family-specific effects, αi, the children’s well-
being, vi, is endogenous. Second, imagine a situation where both parents
and children share similar attitudes towards their life satisfaction, like being
intrinsically happy or unhappy. Such a correlation, for example, due to genetic
3Schwarze and Winkelmann (2005) find that their results remain robust when running the analysis
on a subset of parents having a single child. Therefore, the assumption of a representative child
seems to be justified.
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transmission, generates an endogeneity problem as well. By ignoring these
potential sources of endogeneity, we would attribute the whole correlation
between parents’ and their children’s happiness to altruistic preferences even
when, say by genetic inheritance, intrinsically content parents may tend to have
happier children. Consequently, we would overestimate the weight of altruistic
preferences.
However, the data’s panel structure allows us to isolate that part of the
correlation between parents’ and their children’s happiness that is caused by
altruistic preferences, as long as the unobserved other causes, i.e., the family-
specific effects αi, remain constant over time. In a linear regression model,
we would eliminate αi and obtain a fixed-effects estimator by either taking
first differences or applying the within-transformation. Unfortunately, due
the ordered probit’s nonlinear form, neither is possible. A dummy variable
approach is ruled out as well because it consumes too many degrees of freedom
and leads to an incidental parameters problem with inconsistent maximum
likelihood estimators.
To be able to address time-unvarying unobservable effects in probit for-
mulations all the same, Mundlak (1978) proposed to model the correlation
between the unobserved time-constant effects and the regressors directly.
In our case, by assuming that the family-specific effects, αi, are normally
distributed conditional on the individual means, x¯ and ¯˜v, such that
αi|x¯i, ¯˜vi ∼ N
(
x¯′iδ1 + δ2 ¯˜vi, σ 2α
)
, (4)
their long-run correlation with the dependent variable, hit, can be segregated
from the effect of altruistic preferences. As the sum of two normal distributions
is again normally distributed, we obtain the following conditional probability
model, which accounts for family-specific effects:
P(hit = j |xi, vi, ai) = 
(
κ j − x′itβ − aiηv˜it − x¯′iδ1 − δ2 ¯˜vi
)
−(κ j−1 − x′itβ − aiηv˜it − x¯′iδ1 − δ2 ¯˜vi
)
, (5)
where η measures the causal effect of the children’s on their parents’ happi-
ness. Note that all parameters are now scaled by an unidentified but constant
factor
(
1 + σ 2α
)−1/2. This scaling can be safely ignored, as it cancels out, as long
as we base our inference on standard errors obtained by the bootstrap method
and interpret the parameter estimates either in terms of marginal probability
effects or relative sizes.
3.3 Estimation of the model
To estimate the model, we have to deal with the fact that we cannot directly
observe a given parent’s preference type, i.e., a priori, we do not know whether
he/she is selfish or altruistic. In the following, we discuss our estimation
strategy, which allows us to overcome this kind of incomplete-data problem.
We also briefly address some issues that typically arise during the maximum
likelihood estimation of a finite mixture model.
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The conditional probability model directly translates into the parent’s type-
specific density, which can be written as
f (hi|xi, vi, ai) =
Ti∏
t=1
f (hit|xi, vi, ai) . (6)
As we do not observe the indicator ai directly, parent i’s preference type is
unknown a priori. Therefore, we have to weigh his/her type-specific density
by the probability that he/she belongs to the corresponding type, which equals
this type’s relative size. This yields the model’s log likelihood function
ln L(
; x, v) =
N∑
i=1
ln
[
πa f (hi|xi, vi, ai = 1) + (1 − πa) f (hi|xi, vi, ai = 0)
]
,
(7)
where πa is the share of altruists in the population and 
 = (β ′, δ′, κ ′, η, πa)′
denotes a vector containing all the unknown parameters of the model that
need to be estimated. As in any finite mixture model (for a general treatise,
see McLachlan and Peel 2000), the relative size of the altruists’s group,
πa, cannot be estimated separately from the remaining parameters of the
conditional probability model. It is well known that this highly nonlinear
form and the potential multimodality, the existence of several local maxima,
of the log likelihood function affect the speed of the optimization algorithm
negatively, or even prohibit locating the global maximum.
However, if individual group-membership ai were observed, Dempster and
Laird (1977) show that the so-called complete data log likelihood function
would take on the much simpler form
ln L˜(
; x, v, a)
=
N∑
i=1
ai
[
ln πa + ln f (hi|xi, vi, ai =1)
]
+ (1 − ai)
[
ln (1−πa)+ln f (hi|xi, vi, ai =0)
]
. (8)
In this case, the estimated share of altruists, πˆa = 1/N ∑Ni=1 ai, would be
given analytically and the maximum likelihood estimates of the remaining
parameters could be obtained separately by numerically maximizing the cor-
responding type-specific densities.
Dempster and Laird’s expectation maximization (EM) algorithm now pro-
ceeds iteratively in two steps, E and M. During the E step, given the actual fit
of the data, an a posteriori probability of being an altruist is obtained for each
parent according to Bayes’ law by
τa,i = πa f (hi|xi, vi, ai = 1)
πa f (hi|xi, vi, ai = 1) + (1 − πa) f (hi|xi, vi, ai = 0) . (9)
In the M-step, the complete data log likelihood is maximized, where the
unobserved indicator ai is replaced by these a posteriori probabilities of
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belonging to the altruistic group. Note that, besides being able to deal with
the nonlinearity of the log likelihood function, the EM algorithm also allows
us, based on these τa,i, to endogenously classify each parent as being either
altruistic or selfish.
The problems caused by multimodality can be addressed by implementing
a stochastic version of the EM algorithm, such as the simulated annealing
expectation maximization (SAEM) algorithm developed by Celeux et al.
(1996). In each iteration, it has a positive probability of leaving a once-taken
path to convergence and starting over in a different region of the log likelihood
function. This results in much higher chances of converging to the global
maximum but comes at the cost of even higher computational demands than
the standard EM algorithm. The estimation routine, which we programmed
in the R environment (R Development Core Team 2005), therefore uses a
hybrid form (Render and Walker 1984) of the SAEM algorithm, which is more
reliable in the detection of the global maximum, and the much faster Broyden–
Fletcher–Goldfarb–Shanno (BFGS) algorithm.4
The lowest five categories of parents’ subjective well-being responses are
only sparsely populated, with 11.4% of all responses overall. For practical
reasons, we collapsed those five responses into a single category, ensuring
that, during the bootstrap estimation of the standard errors, all response
categories contain at least one observation in each subsample, a requirement
for estimation of the full model, with a sufficiently high probability. Moreover,
in a single index model such as ours, combining categories does not affect
the estimator’s consistency. The only costs are some loss in efficiency and
the impossibility of predicting conditional outcome probabilities for the single
components (which is not essential for our research question). As several
randomly generated start values all led to the same maximum likelihood
estimates, the model seems to be well identified.
4 Results
In this section, we present the results of four total finite mixture regressions.
The first part deals with model selection issues and therefore addresses the
question of whether we need to control for family-specific effects and alter-
native motivations for paying transfers, such as paternalistic preferences, joy
of giving, and reciprocity. The second part sheds light on our main research
question by discussing the prevalence and extent of altruistic preferences.
Finally, we investigate whether parents who get assigned to the group of
altruists actually pay higher average transfers to their children.
4The BFGS algorithm is a quasi-Newton method that allows solving unconstrained nonlinear
optimization problems (see, for example, Broyden 1970). It is one of the standard hill-climbing
optimization routines implemented in the R environment, as well as other statistical packages such
as STATA.
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4.1 Model selection
Table 3 shows the maximum likelihood estimates of four different finite
mixture ordered probit models, which all discriminate between selfish and
altruistic parents by analyzing the direct dependence of parental utility on
children’s well-being. The standard errors, in parentheses, are based on the
bootstrap method and clustered by individuals to control for possible serial
correlation. Not shown in the table are coefficients on four time dummies in
each model that capture a potential time trend in happiness, as well as the
Mundlak parameter estimates δˆ1 and δˆ2 in the family-effects models.
Model 1 represents the baseline as it only uses the parents’ socioeconomic
characteristics as controls and makes no use of the data’s panel structure.
While still assuming the data to be pooled over time, Model 2 includes the
children’s socioeconomic characteristics as well. Thus, it takes into account
that parents may not only care about their children’s happiness but obtain
utility directly from their offsprings’s socioeconomic status, too. In such a case,
we should control for these paternalistic preferences and prefer model 2 over
model 1 to avoid omitted variable bias. As mentioned in Section 3.2, there may
exist unobserved family-specific effects that result in an endogeneity problem
and lead to biased estimators as well. In contrast to their pooled counterparts,
1 and 2, models 3 and 4 use the data’s panel structure to control for such
time-unvarying unobserved effects by applying Mundlak’s formulation. They
therefore take the potential correlation between the regressors and these
effects into account. Consequently, they consistently identify parents with
altruistic preferences even when correlated family-specific effects are present.
Because the family-effects models include the individual means over time of all
regressors, x¯ and ¯˜v, we have to exclude the variables age, years of schooling,
and gender (but not their means over time) to avoid perfect multicollinearity.
The number of parameters therefore rises by 8 if we go from model 1 to
model 3, and by 13 from model 2 to model 4, respectively.5
Looking at the estimated parameters in Table 3, we find the results of all
four models to be in line with prior findings in the happiness literature. Health
and income both show a significant positive effect on parent’s subjective well-
being, whereas the impact of unemployment is highly significantly negative.
As expected, the effect of good health is very large in relative size.6 With
the exception of log-household size, which is insignificant in the family-effects
5A further potential source of bias, not explicitly considered so far, can arise due to simultaneity,
if children’s utility depends on their parents’ utility as well. To consider the empirical relevance
of such a possibility, we performed a Rivers–Vuong test (Rivers and Vuong 1988) in a pooled
standard ordered probit model with the children’s age and gender as instruments. The fact that
the estimated residuals from the first-stage linear regression of the test were not significant in
the ordered probit estimation of the second stage (p value=0.37) means that the absence of
simultaneity bias could not be rejected.
6The absolute size of the coefficients in the family-effects model cannot be compared directly to
their pooled models’ correspondents, as they are scaled by an unidentified, but constant factor
(1 + σ 2α )1/2.
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Table 3 Finite mixture estimates of parental well-being (N = 8,775 observations)
Coefficients and (Std. err.a) Pooled over time Family Effects
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Fraction of altruists πˆa 0.277 0.274 0.210 0.214
(0.026) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033)
Children’s well-being in the group 0.865∗∗ 0.873∗∗ 0.918∗∗ 0.912∗∗
of altruists ηˆ (0.064) (0.068) (0.094) (0.083)
Good health 0.762∗∗ 0.760∗∗ 0.299∗∗ 0.300∗∗
(0.033) (0.034) (0.031) (0.031)
Log-income 0.480∗∗ 0.471∗∗ 0.146∗∗ 0.140*
(0.039) (0.046) (0.057) (0.056)
Unemployed −0.384∗∗ −0.382∗∗ −0.222∗∗ −0.224∗∗
(0.065) (0.059) (0.062) (0.061)
Married 0.050 0.037 0.244 0.247
(0.060) (0.059) (0.139) (0.143)
Log-household size −0.223∗∗ −0.206∗∗ 0.177 0.185
(0.063) (0.066) (0.091) (0.095)
Distance between households −0.054∗∗ −0.058∗∗ −0.003 −0.004
(0.015) (0.015) (0.031) (0.035)
Transfers paid (in 1,000 EUR) 0.005∗∗ 0.006∗ 0.005∗ 0.005∗
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Ageb 0.185 0.147**
(0.023) (0.036)
Good health of the average child 0.009 −0.041
(0.038) (0.032)
Log-income of the average child −0.049 0.032
(0.041) (0.045)
Unemployment of the average child 0.013 0.054
(0.059) (0.053)
Average child is married 0.036 −0.012
(0.053) (0.055)
Log-household size of the average child 0.016 0.009
(0.056) (0.064)
Age of the average childb 0.068
(0.055)
Years of schooling of the average childc 0.018
(0.010)
Average child is femalec 0.019
(0.042)
Log-likelihood −14,442.63 −14,434.04 −14,299.88 −14,288.39
Number of parameters 20 28 28 41
BIC 29,067 29,122 28,854 28,949
All models additionally contain six threshold parameters and four time dummies. Models 3 and 4
contain additional parameters for the individual means over time.
Source: GSOEP 2000–2004
BIC Bayesian information criterion
∗significant at α = 5%; ∗∗significant at α = 1%
aAll standard errors are clustered and obtained on the basis of 300 bootstrap replications
bOnly individual means over time are included in models 3 and 4 due to perfect time-dependence
cOnly individual means over time are included in model 4 due to time-invariance
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model, all coefficients preserve the same sign. Furthermore, as the parameter
estimates in the family effects models only rely on variation within the individ-
uals over time, it comes at no surprise that their standard errors are generally
larger than these estimated from the pooled models.
While our main interest is in patterns regarding altruism, to be discussed in
detail below, the regressions also provide some evidence for the presence of
paternalistic preferences, joy of giving, and reciprocity. A test for the presence
of paternalistic preferences comes down to the question of whether the coef-
ficients of the children’s socioeconomic characteristics are jointly significant.
Two likelihood ratio tests (model 2 against model 1 and model 4 against
model 3) show that the null-hypothesis of the absence of paternalistic pref-
erences has to be rejected (the p values are 0.028 and 0.042, respectively).
Thus, we conclude that parents care directly for their children’s socioeconomic
standing, which rules out models 1 and 3. Because the remaining two models, 2
and 4, are not nested, they cannot be tested against each other. A comparison
based on the Bayesian information criterion reveals a slight advantage for the
family effects model.
With regards to joy of giving, a necessary condition for such an effect is
that transfers increase a parent’s happiness ceteris paribus, i.e., for a given
happiness of the child. This condition is not sufficient, though, as there may
be other explanations as to why transfers can be associated with increased
happiness. One is that parents in a better financial situation give more to
their children, and they may be happier for that very reason, i.e., the better
financial situation, rather than the transfers per se. Therefore, it is important
to eliminate this potential confounding effect by controlling for parental
income. Second, the observed transfers could be a “pay-back” for received
or anticipated future services that children provide for their parents. We do
not observe such services in the data. Hence, we cannot exclude that part of
the transfer effect is due to reciprocity rather than joy of giving proper. From
model 4, with family effects (p value=0.028) or model 2 for the pooled panel
(p value=0.015), there is evidence that transfers have a statistically significant
positive effect on well-being, after controlling for income, as well as the child’s
utility. Thus, joy of giving and/or reciprocity appear to be motives for transfers
as well.
4.2 Prevalence and extent of altruistic preferences
The main parameters of interest, πˆa, the estimated fraction of altruists, and
ηˆ, the extent of interdependence in the altruists’ preferences, are highly signifi-
cant with p values close to zero in all models. The estimated fraction of altruists
is larger (27.4%) in the pooled model than in the model that accounts for
family-effects (21.4%), although the difference is not statistically significant.
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Table 4 Average predicted change in happiness distribution of altruistic parents for a standard
deviation increase in child happiness index
Response category Model 2 Model 4
Estimates (Std. err.a) Estimates (Std. err.a)
Zero to four −0.155 (0.015) −0.163 (0.017)
Five −0.052 (0.007) −0.045 (0.009)
Six −0.017 (0.005) −0.012 (0.006)
Seven 0.009 (0.006) 0.011 (0.008)
Eight 0.087 (0.008) 0.078 (0.012)
Nine 0.060 (0.005) 0.055 (0.005)
Ten 0.069 (0.011) 0.075 (0.013)
aAll standard errors are clustered and obtained on the basis of 300 bootstrap replications.
Source: GSOEP 2000–2004
All in all, the estimated share of altruists is comparable in magnitude to the
20% reported by Phelps (2001), who relies on psychological tests in a US
survey. So, even if we apply a completely different methodology and examine
members of the same family instead of strangers, we obtain results that are
qualitatively similar to those of Phelps. Furthermore, our estimates for the
spread of altruism are also similar to the fraction of people who treat their
own and others’ payoffs as perfect substitutes in dictator games (Andreoni
and Miller 2002). This indicates that, after controlling for children’s socioeco-
nomic characteristics and parents’ income, as well as applying a family-effects
estimator, survey-based estimates can provide some meaningful information
on preference interdependence and altruism.
As in any other standard ordered probit model, only the signs of the
coefficients within a certain group of the finite mixture ordered probit model
have a direct interpretation (Boes and Winkelmann 2006). Arguably, the
most intuitive way of interpreting the quantitative effect of the representative
child’s well-being in the group of altruistic parents is to compute its average
marginal probability effect (AMPE) of observing a certain parental response
with regard to well-being. To compute the AMPE, each parent has to be
classified either as being altruistic or selfish. This is achieved by assigning
each parent to the altruists whose a posteriori probability, τa,i, is greater than
50%. By definition, marginal probability effects are zero in the group of selfish
parents.
Table 4 shows the AMPE of the child’s well-being in the group of altruistic
parents.7 For example, a permanent unit increase in v˜it (i.e., a one-standard-
deviation increase) would, ceteris paribus, boost the probability of observing
the most frequent subjective well-being response, h = 8, by 8.7 percentage
points in model 2 and 7.8 percentage points in model 4.
7By definition, the AMPEs have to sum up to zero in both models. The small differences (0.001)
from zero in the results reported in Table 4 are due to rounding error.
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4.3 Transfer payments by preference type
If the model correctly identifies the parents with altruistic preferences, we
expect them to be, on average, more likely to make transfers to their children.
Even though, as argued before, not all the parents in the altruistic group
necessarily need to pay actual transfers. As we have both the transfer payments
and the individual probabilities of being an altruist, we can run a regression to
check and quantify this association.
Table 5 shows the results of two ordinary least squares regressions of the
annual transfer amount, paid by the parents to their representative child, on
the a posteriori probabilities τa,i from models 2 and 4. These regressions con-
trol for various socioeconomic characteristics of the parents and their children.
Table 5 Regressions of transfer amount (N = 8, 775 observations)
Coefficients and (std. err.a) OLS regression of
transfers (in 1,000 EUR)
Model 2b Model 4b
A posteriori probability 0.905∗ 1.000∗
of being an altruist τa,i (0.400) (0.490)
Good health −0.128 −0.122
(0.135) (0.132)
Log-income 1.616∗∗ 1.619∗∗
(0.178) (0.219)
Unemployed −0.056 −0.053
(0.139) (0.143)
Married 0690∗∗ 0.686∗∗
(0.166) (0.160)
Log-household size −1.634∗∗ −1.636∗∗
(0.213) (0.228)
Years of schooling 0.251∗∗ 0.251∗∗
(0.038) (0.043)
Good health of the average child −0.128 −0.124
(0.176) (0.180)
Log-income of the average child −0.509∗∗ −0.509∗∗
(0.178) (0.179)
Unemployment of the average child 0.480 0.481
(0.532) (0.533)
Average child is married 0.690 0.221
(0.190) (0.195)
Log-household size of the average child 0.087 0.085
(0.170) (0.180)
Years of schooling of the average child 0.047 0.047
(0.037) (0.037)
Intercept −10.901∗∗ −10.883∗∗
(1.933) (1.780)
R2 0.049 0.049
Source: GSOEP 2000–2004
OLS ordinary least squares
∗significant at α = 5%; ∗∗significant at α = 1%
aAll standard errors are clustered and obtained on the basis of 300 bootstrap replications
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As expected, parents’ income shows a significant positive sign, whereas the
average child’s income is negatively correlated with transfers paid by the
parents. Parental household size also shows the expected negative sign, and
parents with higher education seem to be more willing to pay transfers to their
children. Most interestingly, the results show a significant positive relationship
between transfer payments and the individual a posteriori probabilities of
having altruistic preferences.8 In both models, the estimated transfer amount
is roughly 1, 000 Euros higher for altruistic parents than it is for the rest of the
population. The fact that parents to whom the model assigns a high probability
of having altruistic preferences indeed pay, on average, much higher transfers
to their children gives us a strong indication that the econometric model is
capable of identifying the altruists in the data set.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we estimate the share of parents with altruistic preferences in a
data set stemming from a representative annual survey, the GSOEP. The panel
structure of the data allows us to control for various sources of bias, such as
paternalistic preferences, genetically transmitted inclinations towards general
life satisfaction, or any other sort of time-invariant, family-specific effects. The
estimated share of altruists lies between 21% and 27% of the population,
depending on whether the model accounts for family-specific effects or not.
When we control for family-specific effects, the estimated fraction of altruists,
which lies around one fifth, coincides roughly with the findings of two recent
studies relying on different psychological (Phelps 2001) and experimental
(Andreoni and Miller 2002) methodologies and data sets.
The estimated size of the effect of the children’s reported life satisfaction on
their altruistic parents’ subjective well-being is both robust and relatively large
in terms of marginal probability effects. Besides altruism, we find evidence that
joy of giving and/or reciprocity provide an additional motivation for parents to
pay transfers to their children.
Furthermore, we have shown that actual transfers to the children are,
on average, considerably larger for parents who get, with a high probabil-
ity, assigned to the altruistic group. This provides strong evidence that the
econometric model, on average, correctly identifies the parents with altruistic
preferences, as these individuals show a consistent behavior in their transfer
payments. Our approach, which is based on a finite mixture model to account
for heterogeneity in preference types and relies on subjective well-being as
immediate proxy for utility, seems therefore to be well suited to estimate the
share of altruists in panel surveys such as the GSOEP.
8If we exclude transfers in models 2 and 4, the classification and, consequently, the results remain
stable. Therefore, the dependence of τa,i on transfers paid seems negligible.
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Finally, the finding that some parents’ subjective well-being positively de-
pends on the happiness of their children living in spin-off households confirms
the results of other studies that altruistic preferences are present in at least
a minority of the population. While this study focuses on altruism, further
research has to show whether other cleanly segregated social preference types
exist and how they relate to existing theories of other-regarding preferences.
Such a deeper understanding of the heterogeneity in preferences may be
crucial in determining equilibria, especially when markets are imperfect. So
far, we conclude that altruistic preferences are substantial in their prevalence,
as well as their extent, and they are likely to play an important role in public
economics.
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